Your search found 8 records
1 Brooks, D. B.. 1993. Adjusting the flow: Two comments on the Middle East water crisis. Water International, 18(1):35-39.
Water scarcity ; Irrigation water ; River basins ; Water management ; Water quality / Middle East / Jordan / Israel
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER Record No: H012870)
2 Brooks, D. B.. 1997. Between the great rivers: Water in the heart of the Middle East. International Journal of Water Resources Development, In Rached, E.; Rathgeber, E.; Brooks, D. (Eds.), Water management in Africa and the Middle East: Challenges and opportunities. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. 13(3):291-309; pp.73-94.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER, 333.91 G100 RAC Record No: H021049)
3 Lonergan, S. C.; Brooks, D. B.. 1994. Watershed: The role of fresh water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. xiii, 310p.
Watersheds ; Geography ; Hydrology ; Climate ; Water scarcity ; Water shortage ; Water supply ; Water demand ; Wastewater ; Recycling ; Water harvesting ; Desalinization ; Drip irrigation ; Water loss ; Energy ; Water rates ; Pricing ; Water use ; Water conservation ; Water quality ; Aquifers ; Water pollution ; Water distribution ; Political aspects ; International cooperation ; Water management ; Legal aspects ; River basins ; Water allocation ; Water transfer ; Conflict ; Institutions ; Non-governmental organizations / Middle East / Israel / Palestine / Jordan / West Bank / Gaza Strip / Litani River / Jordan River
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 333.91 G694 LON Record No: H023826)
4 Brooks, D. B.; Rached, E.; Saade, M. (Eds.) 1997. Management of water demand in Africa and the Middle East: Current practices and future needs. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. xi, 78p.
Water management ; Water demand ; Research ; Networks ; Gender ; Social aspects / Africa / Middle East / North Africa / Eastern Africa / Western Africa / Southern Africa
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 333.91 G100 BRO Record No: H024130)
5 Brooks, D. B.. 1997; 1999. Water demand management: Conceptual framework and policy implementation. Water Nepal, In Brooks, D. B.; Rached, E.; Saade, M. (Eds.), Management of water demand in Africa and the Middle East: Current practices and future needs. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. pp.1-10; 7(1):9-17.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 333.91 G100 BRO, P 5425 Record No: H024131)
6 Wolfe, S.; Brooks, D. B.. 2003. Water scarcity: An alternative view and its implications for policy and capacity building. Natural Resources Forum, 27(2):99-107.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER Record No: H031828)
7 Brooks, D. B.. 2006. An operational definition of water demand management. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 22(4):521-528.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER Record No: H039470)
An operational definition of water demand management is proposed with five components: (1) reducing the quantity or quality of water required to accomplish a specific task; (2) adjusting the nature of the task so it can be accomplished with less water or lower quality water; (3) reducing losses in movement from source through use to disposal; (4) shifting time of use to off-peak periods; and (5) increasing the ability of the system to operate during droughts. This definition brings out the drivers of water saving and permits the tracking of gains by the source of the saving. It is applicable to nations at different stages of economic development. It also shows how goals of greater water use eficiency are linked to those of equity, environmental protection and public participation. Taken together, these goals make water demand management less a set of techniques than a concept of governance.
8 Brooks, D. B.. 2011. Response to Late developers and the inequity of “equitable utilization” and the harm of “do no harm” by Kai Wegerich and Oliver Olsson, Water International, 35 (6), 707–717. Water International, 36(3):407-409. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2011.581867]
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: PER Record No: H044483)
(0.08 MB)
It is dif cult to disagree with Wegerich and Olsson’s contention that the combination of the two basic principles for sharing transboundary water, “equitable utilization” and “do no harm”, “favour rst developers” (p. 707). Almost any agreement on property division, whether involving land or water, will inevitably favour earlier developers. The real questions are whether Wegerich and Olsson are presenting the full case. Is it true that, as they contend, the two rules “increasingly favour rst developers” (my italics), and that late developers have “even less incentive to subscribe to these rules” (again my italics). Moreover, opinion is still divided as to whether “no harm” stands equal or secondary to “equitable use” (Wouters et al. 2005). Eckstein (pers. comm., 31 Jan. 2011) indicates many late developers, typically upstream, “have waved the ag of equitable and reasonable utilization for many years” whereas “downstream riparians on the Mekong and the Tigris/Euphrates Rivers have argued that their upstream more developed brethren are violating their right to no signi cant harm”. My contribution to this discussion is divided into two parts. The rst part deals with “do no harm” as the authors interpret the principle, and only mildly quali es the conclusions of Wegerich and Olsson. The second part turns to new interpretations of “do no harm”, and suggests the possibility of a greater challenge to early developers. One further introductory point: this response is written from the perspective of natural-resource economics, and it makes no pretence of being fully informed by international law.
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