Your search found 3 records
1 Bishop, J.; Aylward, B.; Barbier, E.. 1991. Guidelines for applying environmental economics in developing countries. London, UK: IIED. iii, 14p. (LEEC Gatekeeper series GK 91-02)
Environmental effects ; Environmental degradation ; Developing countries ; Natural resources ; Economic policy ; Economic evaluation
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 4942 Record No: H023172)
2 Bhaduri, Anik; Barbier, E.. 2008. Linking rivers in the Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin: exploring the transboundary effects. In Amarasinghe, Upali A.; Sharma, Bharat R. (Eds.) Strategic Analyses of the National River Linking Project (NRLP) of India, Series 2. Proceedings of the Workshop on Analyses of Hydrological, Social and Ecological Issues of the NRLP, New Delhi, India, 9-10 October 2007. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI) pp.373-395.
River basin management ; River basin development ; Development projects ; International cooperation ; Water transfer ; Water allocation ; Planning ; Flow ; Simulation models ; Computer software ; Environmental effects ; Risks / India / Bangladesh / Ganges River / Brahmaputra River / Farakka
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: IWMI 333.9162 G635 AMA Record No: H041813)
(341.75 KB)
The following paper explores the possible inter-linkage of the Ganges and Brahmaputra River Basin and analyzes its effect on future water allocation between the upstream country, India, and the downstream country, Bangladesh. We find that water transfer from the Brahmaputra River could be mutually beneficial for both countries. However, the only possible motivation for the richer upstream country, India, to agree to transfer water to the poorer downstream country, Bangladesh, is political altruism. Using a political economy model we find that, if there is a good political relationship between India and Bangladesh, then India could be altruistic toward Bangladesh and transfer more water downstream. Changes in political altruism factor, however, could entice India to exercise unilateral diversion, in which case simulations predict that Bangladesh would incur large environmental damages. Political uncertainty may also result in unilateral diversion of water by India, and could prevent agreement on water transfers from the Brahmaputra. We therefore explore the conditions under which Bangladesh could accept an Indian proposal to transfer water from Brahmaputra, despite political uncertainty.
3 Pearce, D.; Barbier, E.; Markandya, A.; Barrett, S.; Turner, R. K.; Swanson, T. 1991. Blueprint 2: greening the world economy. London, UK: Earthscan; London, UK: London Environmental Economics Centre. 232p.
Environmental economics ; Ethics ; Environmental degradation ; Population growth ; Deforestation ; Aid ; Financing ; Biodiversity conservation ; Ozone depletion ; Global warming
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 333.72 G000 PEA Record No: H044408)
(0.22 MB)
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