Your search found 9 records
1 Dixon, J. A.. 1982. Food consumption patterns and related demand parameters in Indonesia: A review of available evidence. Washington, DC, USA: IFPRI. iv, 51 p.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 338.19 G662 DIX Record No: H0260)
2 Norgaard, R. B.; Dixon, J. A.. 1984. Project design and evaluation using economic and coevolutionary criteria. California, CA, USA: University of California. University of California working paper no.333.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 978 Record No: H02559)
3 Dixon, J. A.; Talbot, L. M.; Le Moigne, G. 1990. Dams and the environment: Considerations in World Bank Projects. Washington, DC, USA: World Bank. vii, 63p. (World Bank technical paper no.110)
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 627.8 G000 DIX Record No: H06378)
4 Rambo, A. T.; Dixon, J. A.; Tsechin, W. 1984. Ecosystem models for development: Workshop report. Honolulu, HI, USA: East-West Environment and Policy Institute. vi, 35p.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 574.5 G000 RAM Record No: H08969)
5 Howe, J. A.; Dixon, J. A.. 1993; 2002. Inefficiencies in water project design and operation in the third world: An economic perspective. Water Resources Research, Also published in: In Saleth, R. M. (Ed.), 2002. Water resources and economic development. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.pp.339-344. 29(7):1889-1894.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER Record No: H013310)
Water projects in less developed countries (LDCs) frequently are poorly operated and maintained. As a result, project benefits and development impacts fall short of plans. The problems begin in the project identification, design, and construction stages: donor and host country biases lead to inappropriate projects, unsustainable technologies, and shoddy construction. Later operation and maintenance are then difficult or impossible. Casual factors include donor desire to build monuments and sell technology, provision of excessive capital to favored sectors or institutions, and an unwillingness to require a reasonable quid pro from the host country. Host country factors include excessive administrative centralization, lack of rewards for good operation and maintenance, and widespread corruption in forms that seriously distort allocative efficiency. Until individual actors on both sides can be motivated to pursue the long-run good of the LDC, Third World water projects will continue to have low or negative net payoffs.
6 Dixon, J. A.. 2001. Policy relevant monitoring systems: Learning lessons and lessons learned. In Hazell, P.; Chakravorty, U.; Dixon, J.; Celis, R. Monitoring systems for managing natural resources: Economics, indicators and environmental externalities in a Casta Rican watershed. IFPRI. Environment and Production Technology Division; World Bank. Environment Department. pp.126-132.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 5845 Record No: H028769)
7 Dixon, J.A.; James, D.E.; Sherman, P.B. 1990. Dryland management: economic case studies. London, UK: UK Earthscan. 364p.; 19.5cm.
(Location: IWMI-SEA Call no: 333.73 G000 DIX Record No: BKK-106)
8 Dixon, J.A.; James D.E.; Sherman, P.B. 1989. The economics of dry land management. London, UK: Earthscan. 302p.: ill., table; 19.5cm.
(Location: IWMI-SEA Call no: 333.73 G000 DIX Record No: BKK-111)
9 Dixon, J.A.; Sherman, P.B. 1990. Economics of protected areas: A new look at benefits and costs. London, UK: Earthscan. 235p.; 19.5 cm.
(Location: IWMI-SEA Call no: 333.72 G000 DIX Record No: BKK-137)
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