Your search found 7 records
1 Warner, J. F.; Bindraban, P. S.; van Keulen, H. 2006. Introduction: Water for food and ecosystems: How to cut which pie? International Journal of Water Resources Development, 22(1):3-13.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER Record No: H038378)
2 Warner, J. F.. 2006. More sustainable participation?: Multi-stakeholder platforms for integrated catchment management. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 22(1):15-35.
Water management ; Catchment areas ; Participatory management ; Farmer participation ; Conflict ; Leadership
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: PER Record No: H038379)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07900620500404992
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H038379.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H038379.pdf
(0.19 MB)
This paper argues for realistic expectations of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs). MSPs are currently a hot topic in the water policy community, despite voices of disillusionment with participation in development work. Research carried out in Peru, Argentina, India, South Africa and Belgium suggests that platforms certainly can prove helpful networks in communication on and management of competing claims to water, managing coordination problems, coalition-building and/ or visioning. However, experience has put paid to implicit and explicit expectations from platforms, especially with a view to the integration of knowledge and actors. It makes no sense to separate distributive negotiation and politics (‘bad’) from integrative negotiation and social learning (‘good’). Platforms mix both modalities of negotiation, and actors may strategically withhold or contribute their knowledge. Second, no significant power sharing (vertical inclusion) takes place. A typology of MSPs ranked by influence finds no platform with a significant mandate. It is suggested that MSPs are an institutional bargaining space that is especially useful for visioning and information exchange, but cautioned not to insist that ‘water MSPs’ confine themselves to water issues only, and to institutionalized groups only. For some stakeholders, the communication and information process itself is good enough, but others will want results: ‘food on the table’. Some stakeholders will never join as they do not see how it benefits them and/or because they find it more advantageous to work around the platform. Initiators of platforms for stakeholder involvement in water management should therefore be very clear on what the participatory process aims at and can realistically achieve.
3 Warner, J. F.; Johnson, C. L. 2007. Virtual water – real people: Useful concept or prescriptive tool? Water International, 32(1):63-77.
Water resource management ; Policy ; Water balance ; Water scarcity ; Water deficit ; Water stress ; Water distribution
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: P 7970 Record No: H040517)
4 Mutahara, M.; Warner, J. F.; Wals, A. E. J.; Khan, M. S. A.; Wester, P. 2018. Social learning for adaptive delta management: tidal river management in the Bangladesh Delta. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 34(6):923-943. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1326880]
Natural resources management ; Deltas ; Water resources ; Water management ; Rivers ; Social aspects ; Participatory approaches ; Community involvement ; Stakeholders ; Institutional development ; State intervention ; Technology ; Coastal area / Bangladesh / Bangladesh Delta / Khulna / Jessore
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048945)
(1.53 MB)
The article analyzes Tidal River Management in Bangladesh from a social learning perspective. Four cases were investigated using participatory assessment. Knowledge acquisition through transformations in the Tidal River Management process was explored as an intended learning outcome. The study finds that social learning occurred more prominently at the individual stakeholder level and less at the collective level. For Tidal River Management to be responsive and sustainable, especially in times of increased uncertainty and climate vulnerability, more attention needs to be paid to coordination and facilitation of multi-level learning that includes all stakeholders.
5 Vij, S.; Warner, J. F.; Biesbroek, R.; Groot, A. 2020. Non-decisions are also decisions: power interplay between Bangladesh and India over the Brahmaputra River. Water International, 45(4):254-274. (Special issue: Power in Water Diplomacy) [doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2018.1554767]
International waters ; Water resources ; River basins ; Decision making ; Political aspects ; International cooperation ; Hydropower ; Climate change adaptation ; Conflict ; Negotiation ; Treaties / India / Bangladesh / Brahmaputra River / Arunachal Pradesh / Assam
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H049843)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02508060.2018.1554767?needAccess=true#aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudGFuZGZvbmxpbmUuY29tL2RvaS9wZGYvMTAuMTA4MC8wMjUwODA2MC4yMDE4LjE1NTQ3Njc/bmVlZEFjY2Vzcz10cnVlQEBAMA==
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H049843.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H049843.pdf
(2.35 MB) (2.35 MB)
This article shows how Bangladesh and India intentionally maintain the status quo for the Brahmaputra River at the transboundary level, using material and ideational resources. Results show that India wants to reduce its hegemonic vulnerabilities and Bangladesh aims to maintain its control over the Brahmaputra river, simultaneously building its technical and negotiation skills. We conclude that the underlying processes of maintaining the status quo can be comprehended as ‘non-decision making’. The analysis presented will help policy actors to push towards a forward-looking climate change adaptation planning for the Brahmaputra River.
6 Rigi, H.; Warner, J. F.. 2020. Two-level games on the trans-boundary river Indus: obstacles to cooperation. Water Policy, 1-19. (Online first) [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2020.090]
International waters ; International cooperation ; Rivers ; International agreements ; Treaties ; Conflicts ; Political aspects ; Policies ; Strategies ; Dams ; Case studies / India / Pakistan / Indus River / Kashmir
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050020)
(0.35 MB)
This synthesis paper explores the reasons hindering water cooperation between India and Pakistan on the Indus River Basin. It argues that both domestic and international-level elements narrow the size of the ‘win-sets’ which make water cooperation between the two states highly challenging. Not only state actors but also the domestic actors in both India and Pakistan have repeatedly played ‘water games’. Further, due to long-standing geopolitical and territorial conflicts between India and Pakistan, the strategies pursued so far by these states including ‘securitization’, ‘issue-linkage’ and ‘alliance strategies’ as leverage mechanisms, have also contributed to the lack of cooperation in their water realm.
7 Vij, S.; Warner, J. F.; Mehta, A. S.; Barua, A. 2024. Status quo in transboundary waters: unpacking non-decision making and non-action. Global Environmental Change, 85:102821. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102821]
Transboundary waters ; Politics ; Decision making ; Conflicts ; River basins ; Infrastructure / Greece / Turkiye / China / India / Syrian Arab Republic / Iraq / Brahmaputra / Maritsa / Euphrates-Tigris
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H052726)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378024000256/pdfft?md5=32b89a139685fde45fa14465197cf21c&pid=1-s2.0-S0959378024000256-main.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052726.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052726.pdf
(7.67 MB) (7.67 MB)
Transboundary water decision-making takes place in a power-loaded environment. Apart from conflicts or cooperation-based outcomes, partial or complete status quo is also possible outcome in transboundary water interactions. Literature in the last two decades has primarily focused on conflicts and/or cooperation only, with a limited understanding of the status quo and its various forms. Drawing from the work of Bacharach and Baratz and other power scholars from sociology, international relations, and public policy, this article presents tactics for non-decision making and non-action, leading to a status quo. Specifically, we address the question: how can non-decision making and non-action shape the status quo in transboundary waters? Conceptually, based on various strands of literature, we develop a typology of status quo comprised of (1) renunciation; (2) abstention; (3) non-participation; and (4) non-action and showing that the status quo is a significant intermediary (at times temporally extended) outcome in transboundary water interaction. Like conflicts and cooperation, we posit that the status quo is often purposefully maintained due to the political, social, cultural, economic, and biophysical aspects of the river basins. We illustrate this by the example of three transboundary river basins: Brahmaputra, Maritsa, and Euphrates-Tigris. Our empirical analysis also identified an additional type of status quo, ‘non-significant deliberation’ in a multi-track diplomacy setting. This tactic refers to not purposefully allowing informal negotiations to transform or influence the highest level of political deliberation (i.e., track-1 diplomacy).
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