Your search found 4 records
1 Yetim, M. 2023. Domestic institutions and international collective action problems: international water rights conflicts. Water Policy, 25(4):415-428. [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2023.250]
International waters ; Transboundary waters ; Water rights ; Property rights ; Institutions ; Collective action ; International cooperation ; Water resources ; Water management ; Climate change ; Conflicts ; Uncertainty ; Sustainability ; Drought ; Water scarcity ; Water use / Turkiye / Syrian Arab Republic / Iraq / Iran Islamic Republic / Euphrates
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051875)
https://iwaponline.com/wp/article-pdf/25/4/415/1211911/025040415.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051875.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051875.pdf
(0.35 MB) (360 KB)
To what extent do domestic institutions affect the solution of collective action problems in international waters? Dwindling water resources and dire climate change projections make the determination of water rights in international rivers a major source of contention among states. If the states cooperate based on integrated water resource management principles, they could achieve social equity, economic efficiency, and sustainability. Yet, many international rivers remain subject to unilateral exploitation. This paper explores the role of domestic institutions in facilitating the emergence of international water rights. Adopting a political economy approach, it presents a case study analysis of the dispute over the Euphrates and explores the complex interaction of governing institutions in achieving efficient water management. I argue that the solution to the collective action dilemma in water rights is the creation of property rights institutions, which requires high levels of trust and reciprocity among highly motivated actors, who are accountable to their people.
2 Jones-Crank, L. J.; Lu, J.; Orlove, B. 2024. Bridging the gap between the water-energy-food nexus and compound risks. Environmental Research Letters, 19(2):024004. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ad1ad0]
Risk assessment ; Water resources ; Water scarcity ; Surface water ; Energy ; Food security ; Nexus approaches ; Climate change ; Hydroelectric power generation ; Policies ; Governance ; Stakeholders ; Case studies / South East Asia / Central Asia / South Asia / Western Asia / Turkiye / Iraq / Syrian Arab Republic / India / Nepal / Pakistan / Bhutan / Bangladesh / Myanmar / China / Laos / Vietnam / Thailand / Cambodia / Tigris-Euphrates River Basin / Hindu Kush / Mekong River Basin
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H052538)
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ad1ad0/pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052538.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052538.pdf
(1.28 MB) (1.28 MB)
The water-energy-food (WEF) nexus is a concept and approach to examine the interactions of water, energy, and food resources. Similarly, compound risks are a set of risk types that consider multiple connected factors that amplify risks. While both concepts are promoted as approaches to move beyond silos and address complex problems in environmental governance, there has been limited exploration of their overlap. Our study integrates these two approaches for more holistic assessment and management of resources in the context of climate risks. We examine the connections between the WEF nexus and compound risk in two ways. First, we review the literature to identify previous conceptual connections between the WEF nexus and compound risks. Second, we review seven case studies with WEF nexus interactions and compound risks to identify how the two approaches might be considered in practice. Our results demonstrate that there is limited, though not non-existent, integration of the two concepts in both the theoretical literature and in the case studies. The four of the seven cases that do show some level of connection in practice demonstrate opportunities for greater integration in the future, such as leveraging the water sector as a bridge to address WEF nexus and compound risk challenges together.
3 Cetin, O.; Fayrap, A.; Yolcu, R. 2024. Sustainability and modernization of agricultural irrigation: a comparative assessment of two irrigation schemes. Irrigation and Drainage, 73(1):284-293. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/ird.2878]
Irrigation schemes ; Irrigation systems ; Irrigation water ; Modernization ; Sustainability ; Water productivity ; Water conservation ; Surface irrigation ; Trickle irrigation ; Sprinkler irrigation ; Water use ; Crops / Turkiye / Ergani Irrigation Scheme / Devegecidi Irrigation Scheme
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H052614)
(0.46 MB)
In this study, two different irrigation schemes in Turkey were evaluated. One is Devegeçidi irrigation, which was put into operation in 1972. The command area is 5800 ha, and farmers used surface irrigation. Ergani irrigation, a modern irrigation scheme using drip and/or sprinkler irrigation systems with an irrigation area of 1866 ha, was put into operation in 2021. The average total water use (TWU), irrigation efficiency (IE), water economic productivity (WEP) and net income (NI) were 11,728 m3 ha-1, 45%, $0.21 m-3 and $2354 ha-1 in the Devegecidi irrigation, respectively, and all the same criteria results were 6189 m3 ha-1, 81%, $0.78 m-3 and $4789 ha-1 in the Ergani irrigation, respectively. In addition, irrigation water productivities (IWPs) in wheat, cotton and corn for the Devegeçidi irrigation were 0.78, 0.47 and 1.21 kg m-3, while those values were 0.89, 0.89 and 2.26 kg m-3 in the Ergani irrigation scheme, respectively. The study results show that the modernization of irrigation systems is significantly important in saving irrigation water and increasing the income of farmers and water productivity. These indicators can guide decision makers in the modernization of irrigation systems.
4 Vij, S.; Warner, J. F.; Mehta, A. S.; Barua, A. 2024. Status quo in transboundary waters: unpacking non-decision making and non-action. Global Environmental Change, 85:102821. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102821]
Transboundary waters ; Politics ; Decision making ; Conflicts ; River basins ; Infrastructure / Greece / Turkiye / China / India / Syrian Arab Republic / Iraq / Brahmaputra / Maritsa / Euphrates-Tigris
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H052726)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378024000256/pdfft?md5=32b89a139685fde45fa14465197cf21c&pid=1-s2.0-S0959378024000256-main.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052726.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052726.pdf
(7.67 MB) (7.67 MB)
Transboundary water decision-making takes place in a power-loaded environment. Apart from conflicts or cooperation-based outcomes, partial or complete status quo is also possible outcome in transboundary water interactions. Literature in the last two decades has primarily focused on conflicts and/or cooperation only, with a limited understanding of the status quo and its various forms. Drawing from the work of Bacharach and Baratz and other power scholars from sociology, international relations, and public policy, this article presents tactics for non-decision making and non-action, leading to a status quo. Specifically, we address the question: how can non-decision making and non-action shape the status quo in transboundary waters? Conceptually, based on various strands of literature, we develop a typology of status quo comprised of (1) renunciation; (2) abstention; (3) non-participation; and (4) non-action and showing that the status quo is a significant intermediary (at times temporally extended) outcome in transboundary water interaction. Like conflicts and cooperation, we posit that the status quo is often purposefully maintained due to the political, social, cultural, economic, and biophysical aspects of the river basins. We illustrate this by the example of three transboundary river basins: Brahmaputra, Maritsa, and Euphrates-Tigris. Our empirical analysis also identified an additional type of status quo, ‘non-significant deliberation’ in a multi-track diplomacy setting. This tactic refers to not purposefully allowing informal negotiations to transform or influence the highest level of political deliberation (i.e., track-1 diplomacy).
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