Your search found 10 records
1 Chang, N.-B.; Pires, A. 2015. Sustainable solid waste management: a systems engineering approach. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley. 908p. (IEEE Press Series on Systems Science and Engineering)
Waste management ; Solid wastes ; Urban wastes ; Recycling ; Sustainable development ; Resource management ; Systems analysis ; Engineering ; Stochastic models ; Decision making ; Fuzzy logic ; Game theory ; Risk management ; Social aspects ; Economic aspects ; Legal aspects ; Regional planning ; Environmental information technology ; Environmental impact assessment ; Ecology ; Climate change ; Industrialization ; Carbon ; Life cycle assessment ; Case studies
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 628.44 G000 CHA Record No: H047001)
(0.38 MB)
2 Bocchiola, D.; Pelosi, M. G.; Soncini, A. 2017. Effects of hydrological changes on cooperation in transnational catchments: the case of the Syr Darya. Water International, 42(7):852-873. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2017.1376568]
International waters ; Catchment areas ; International cooperation ; Hydrological regime ; Water management ; Climate change ; Water use ; Conflict ; Flow discharge ; Cost benefit analysis ; Profitability ; Statistical methods ; Game theory ; Models ; Probability analysis ; Case studies / Central Asia / Uzbekistan / Kazakhstan / Kyrgyzstan / Syr Darya Catchment / Toktogul Dam
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048381)
(2.31 MB)
Water allocation along the Syr Darya River may be affected by climate change. Here we statistically model cooperation strategies, country profits, and sensitivity of cooperation, showing that the hydrological regime affects transboundary cooperation. Climate change in the twenty-first century may reduce glacial cover, and reducing stream flows, decreasing chances of cooperation and potentially raising conflicts. Comparison with other transboundary catchments in Central Asia indicates moderate-to-high risk of conflicts for the Syr Darya. A template is provided for assessment of the stability of cooperation in the Syr Darya basin, and in catchments similarly dependent on water availability.
3 Meinzen-Dick, R.; Janssen, M. A.; Kandikuppa, S.; Chaturvedi, R.; Rao, K.; Theis, S. 2018. Playing games to save water: collective action games for groundwater management in Andhra Pradesh, India. World Development, 107:40-53. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.02.006]
Groundwater management ; Water conservation ; Collective action ; Game theory ; Human behaviour ; Experimentation ; Groundwater table ; Crops ; Stakeholders ; Nongovernmental organizations ; Research organizations ; Communities ; Models / India / Andhra Pradesh
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048587)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X18300445/pdfft?md5=edf7de8abb3f4dffd9577674b0b40969&pid=1-s2.0-S0305750X18300445-main.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H048587.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H048587.pdf
(0.93 MB) (952 KB)
Groundwater is one of the most challenging common pool resources to govern, resulting in resource depletion in many areas. We present an innovative use of collective action games to not only measure propensity for cooperation, but to improve local understanding of groundwater interrelationships and stimulate collective governance of groundwater, based on a pilot study in Andhra Pradesh, India. The games simulate crop choice and consequences for the aquifer. These were followed by a community debriefing, which provided an entry point for discussing the interconnectedness of groundwater use, to affect mental models about groundwater. A slightly modified game was played in the same communities, one year later. Our study finds communication within the game increased the likelihood of groups reaching sustainable extraction levels in the second year of play, but not the first. Individual payments to participants based on how they played in the game had no effect on crop choice. Either repeated experience with the games or the revised structure of the game evoked more cooperation in the second year, outweighing other factors influencing behavior, such as education, gender, and trust index scores. After the games were played, a significantly higher proportion of communities adopted water registers and rules to govern groundwater, compared to other communities in the same NGO water commons program. Because groundwater levels are affected by many factors, games alone will not end groundwater depletion. However, games can contribute to social learning about the role of crop choice and collective action, to motivate behavior change toward more sustainable groundwater extraction.
4 Buck, M.; Sturzaker, J.; Mell, I. 2021. Playing games around climate change – new ways of working to develop climate change resilience. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 19p. (Online first) [doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2021.1975106]
Climate change adaptation ; Climate change mitigation ; Resilience ; Strategies ; Planning ; Game theory ; Cooperation ; Political aspects ; Environmental factors ; Case studies / England / Scotland / Birmingham / London / Manchester / Bristol / Clyde Valley
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050742)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09640568.2021.1975106
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H050742.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H050742.pdf
(0.93 MB) (956 KB)
This paper uses game theory to examine the efforts of public sector actors in the UK to integrate climate change interventions within development processes. Drawing on desk-based analysis and interviews, we identify instances where private-sector developers act strategically to exploit public-sector imperatives to deliver economic growth and housing. We find these imperatives constrained the agency of planners to effectively reconcile climate mitigation/adaptation objectives within wider priorities of economic growth. Yet, we identify instances whereby strategic planning frameworks, informal networks and bespoke development frameworks were effective means to build trust between actors and foster co-operation, better enabling development which meets climate change mitigation/adaptation objectives. In doing so, we illustrate the practical and theoretical value of game theory, whilst highlighting how careful use of strategic planning can support achieving climate change mitigation/adaptation objectives at a local scale.
5 Noori, M.; Emadi, A.; Fazloula, R. 2021. An agent-based model for water allocation optimization and comparison with the game theory approach. Water Supply, 21(7):3584-3601. [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/ws.2021.124]
Water allocation ; Agent-based models ; Game theory ; Water resource management ; Water demand ; Reservoirs ; Stakeholders / Iran Islamic Republic / Tajan Basin / Shahid Rajaei Dam
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050815)
https://iwaponline.com/ws/article-pdf/21/7/3584/960410/ws021073584.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H050815.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H050815.pdf
(0.75 MB) (772 KB)
Despite the advancement of technical tools for the analysis of complex systems, the most important issue in solving water resource problems focuses on the interaction of human and natural systems. Agent-Based Model (ABM) has been used as an effective tool for the development of integrated human and environmental models. One of the main challenges of this method is identifying and describing the main agents. In this study, three main approaches including Genetic Algorithm (GA), cooperative game theory and ABM have been used to optimize water allocation in Tajan catchment. The proposed ABM is a new equation for calculating stakeholder utility and simulating their interactions that can create a hydrological-environmental-human relationship for demand management and optimal water allocation. The results showed that the total benefit of cooperative game theory and ABM relative to GA has been increased 24% and 21% respectively. Although the total benefit in game theory is greater than the ABM, but the ABM considering the agents feedback propose a more comprehensive approach to optimal water allocation.
6 Shahbaznezhadfard, M.; Yousef, S. 2022. Development of a dynamics-based model for analyzing strategic water–environmental conflicts: systems thinking instead of linear thinking. Water Policy, 24(1):83-100. [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2021.145]
Transboundary waters ; Environmental factors ; Conflicts ; International cooperation ; River basins ; Game theory ; Modelling ; Strategies ; Sustainable development ; Political aspects ; Decision making / Middle East / Turkey / Syrian Arab Republic / Iraq / Tigris-Euphrates Basin
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050894)
https://iwaponline.com/wp/article-pdf/24/1/83/997634/024010083.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H050894.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H050894.pdf
(0.56 MB) (568 KB)
A new evolution in graph modeling for conflict resolution (GMCR), a robust methodology for conflict resolution, is presented in this research to incorporate the systems thinking concept into the conventional paradigm of GMCR so that the dynamic nature of water–environmental conflicts can be modeled, and better outcomes obtained. To achieve this objective, a methodology is developed in three phases: static, dynamic, and outcome-based analyses. To develop the methodology, the Tigris–Euphrates basin conflict in the Middle East over the past 30 years, as a real-life case study, is used to show the robustness and capabilities of the proposed approach. Finally, a sustainable resolution to the current conflict is proposed, and the results are discussed. The proposed methodology benefits from improving the existing and often static-based conflict resolution developments by considering the dynamic nature so that the true root causes of complex conflicts are addressed, better strategic insights achieved, and comprehensive resolution provided.
7 Lu, Z.; Cai, F.; Liu, J.; Yang, J.; Zhang, S.; Wu, S. 2022. Evolution of water resource allocation in the river basin between administrators and managers. Hydrology Research, 53(5):716-732. [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/nh.2022.128]
Water resources ; Water allocation ; River basins ; Decision making ; Regulations ; Managers ; Strategies ; Water security ; Water intake ; Water rights ; Models ; Game theory
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051131)
https://iwaponline.com/hr/article-pdf/53/5/716/1059207/nh0530716.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051131.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051131.pdf
(0.64 MB) (652 KB)
The reasonable allocation of water resources runs through the main links of regional water resource planning and management, which is a complex decision-making issue, ensures the sustainable development and utilization of water resources, and makes a greater contribution to the sustainable development of social economy. In this paper, evolutionary game theory is applied to the allocation of watershed water resources in a river basin. Also, the analysis of the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategies of water resource allocation among water resource manufacturers was done. It was found that the evolutionary game among the water resource manufacturers has only an evolutionary stability strategy. Considering the evolutionary game between water resource managers and water resource manufacturers, the evolutionary stability strategy is analyzed. This study suggests that there are two evolutionary stability strategies ( normal water intake, high level of regulation) and ( excess water intake, low level of regulation) between the water resource manufacturers and the administrative water resource regulators, where the strategy ( normal water intake, high level of regulation) is the expected direction. The evolution factors of the strategy ( normal water intake, high level of regulation) were analyzed. Furthermore, it also suggested that an effective reward and punishment mechanism will help to draw up excessive water, dismantle the conflicts between the water resource manufacturers and the administrative water resource regulators, and increase the benefits of both sides.
8 Zanjanian, H.; Niksokhan, M. H.; Ghorbani, M.; Rezaei, A. R. 2022. A novel framework for water right conflict resolution considering actors’ power and inter-organizational relationships analysis. Journal of Hydroinformatics, 24(3):622-641. [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/hydro.2022.166]
Water rights ; Conflicts ; Social network analysis ; Water resources ; Water allocation ; Decision making ; Organizations ; Stakeholders ; Game theory ; Modelling ; Reservoirs ; Case studies / Iran Islamic Republic / Ilam Dam
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051219)
https://iwaponline.com/jh/article-pdf/24/3/622/1054017/jh0240622.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051219.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051219.pdf
(1.07 MB) (1.07 MB)
Water allocation from reservoirs has always been a challenging issue for decision-makers. The more the stakeholders in the allocation projects, the more conflicts among them could be expected to receive more water rights. As a result, it is necessary to study the relations and power among organizations. In this study, the Ilam dam was used as the case study, and the social network analysis was also used to assess the interactions among the involved organizations and evaluate their power using centrality measures. Based on the network analysis and actors’ power assessment, a novel approach was applied to define and analyze the conflict associated with water quantity allocation. Accordingly, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution was used for both basic and power-asymmetric conflict analysis models. In the power-asymmetric approach, the direct power scenario gives the most powerful actor the possibility of punishing the violating organizations using their political and executive power. Based on the status quo of the conflict, the results obtained from the equilibrium analysis show that both the power of the main actor and the nature of relationships other actors have with the most powerful actor directly influence the conflict's outcome.
9 Saha, D.; Taron, Avinandan. 2021. Joint forest management in India: a game theoretic analysis of its evolution and reasons behind poor performance. Indian Journal of Economics, 102 Part-2(405):277-295.
Forest management ; Deforestation ; Natural resources management ; Property rights ; Game theory / India
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051673)
(3.51 MB)
India initiated Joint Forest Management in 1990, by the National Forest Policy of 1988. It stressed on the involvement of partnership between the Forest Department and local communities for sustainable forest management. This study utilises a game theoretic framework to describe the evolution of this system, and its present structural problems. The model indicates conditions of improvement within the institution to make it sustainable. These recommendations are based on certain assumptions of the existing situation. Therefore, using the conclusion for policy recommendations needs a thorough appreciation of complexities existing in the system, which has been simplified in the model.
10 Wang, J.; Wei, J.; Shan, W.; Zhao, J. 2023. Modeling the water-energy-food-environment nexus and transboundary cooperation opportunity in the Brahmaputra River Basin. Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies, 49:101497. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejrh.2023.101497]
Transboundary waters ; International waters ; International cooperation ; River basin ; Climate change ; Hydroelectric power generation ; Game theory ; Water resources ; Water demand ; Frameworks ; Sustainable development ; Infrastructure ; Economic benefits ; Economic development ; Food security ; Energy ; Stakeholders ; Nexus approaches ; Irrigation water ; Runoff ; Environmental protection / China / India / Bangladesh / Brahmaputra River Basin
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H052185)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214581823001842/pdfft?md5=b703e2348e298690efb1edfb889d077d&pid=1-s2.0-S2214581823001842-main.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052185.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H052185.pdf
(7.71 MB) (7.71 MB)
Study region: The Brahmaputra River Basin.
Study focus: The Brahmaputra River Basin (BRB) is the most environmentally fragile and politically unstable transboundary river basin in South Asia. Therefore, incorporating the environmental sector into water-energy-food system analysis is necessary to better serve water resource management in the BRB. Integrated water resources system analysis can provide more perspectives for alleviating political tension and promoting cooperation in the basin. This study proposes a modeling framework to explore the water-energy-food-environment (WEFE) nexus and analyze transboundary cooperation opportunities in the BRB. Employing the framework, we attempt to answer three questions: (1) how can we understand the relationships between various sectors and coordinate their water demands? (2) How do these relationships influence riparian countries’ decisions? (3) What measures can promote the sustainable development of the BRB under climate change and water infrastructure development?
New hydrological insights for the region: The results show that the trade-off curve between economic benefits and environmental costs has declining marginal value in the BRB. When environmental constraints are raised, countries are more inclined to cooperate to obtain more economic benefits. Full cooperation in the BRB increases the economic benefits and prompts riparian countries to take a greener road among the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP126). Water resource project construction can improve the utility of water resources in a country, thus enhancing its discourse power on benefit reallocation.
Study focus: The Brahmaputra River Basin (BRB) is the most environmentally fragile and politically unstable transboundary river basin in South Asia. Therefore, incorporating the environmental sector into water-energy-food system analysis is necessary to better serve water resource management in the BRB. Integrated water resources system analysis can provide more perspectives for alleviating political tension and promoting cooperation in the basin. This study proposes a modeling framework to explore the water-energy-food-environment (WEFE) nexus and analyze transboundary cooperation opportunities in the BRB. Employing the framework, we attempt to answer three questions: (1) how can we understand the relationships between various sectors and coordinate their water demands? (2) How do these relationships influence riparian countries’ decisions? (3) What measures can promote the sustainable development of the BRB under climate change and water infrastructure development?
New hydrological insights for the region: The results show that the trade-off curve between economic benefits and environmental costs has declining marginal value in the BRB. When environmental constraints are raised, countries are more inclined to cooperate to obtain more economic benefits. Full cooperation in the BRB increases the economic benefits and prompts riparian countries to take a greener road among the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP126). Water resource project construction can improve the utility of water resources in a country, thus enhancing its discourse power on benefit reallocation.
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