Your search found 3 records
1 Brown, K. A.; Hyer, N. L. 2010. Managing projects: a team-based approach. New York, NY, USA: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 416p. + DVD. (McGraw-Hill/Irwin Series Operations and Decision Sciences)
Project management ; Project design ; Group approaches ; Managers ; Project evaluation ; Performance indexes ; Risk assessment ; Estimation ; Uncertainty ; Time management ; Resource allocation ; Institutional constraints ; Organizational design ; Economic analysis ; Monitoring ; Communication ; Planning ; Decision making ; Computer software ; Case studies
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 658.404 G000 BRO Record No: H047339)
(2.14 MB)
2 Braimah, I.; Amponsah, O.; Asibey, M. O. 2016. The effectiveness of the local management systems of rural water facilities for sustainable service delivery: a case study of the Sekyere East District, Ghana. Sustainable Water Resources Management, 2(4):405-418. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40899-016-0070-7]
Water supply ; Sustainability ; Rural communities ; Community management ; Drinking water ; Boreholes ; Maintenance ; Managers ; Accountability ; Households ; Case studies / Ghana / Sekyere East District
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H047908)
(0.82 MB)
Involving communities in the operation and maintenance (O&M) of water facilities is expected to be a cost-effective means of ensuring sustainable provision of water to rural communities in Ghana. The purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of the community-based management strategy for the O&M of water facilities in the Sekyere East District of Ghana and to identify the best practices for replication. The data for the study were gathered from the District Water and Sanitation Team (DWST), Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) Committees and Water Boards (WBs) through direct interviews and focus group discussions. Analyses of the data revealed that the spirit of voluntarism that was expected to drive the local managers to be effective was fading away. Furthermore, the local managers were unable to mobilise adequate revenue to defray the cost of O&M partly due to households’ reluctance to pay coupled with the general lack of accountability on the part of the managers. The authors concluded that for the local managers to be effective, they need to be effectively motivated so that they could in turn be accountable to the community members.
3 Lu, Z.; Cai, F.; Liu, J.; Yang, J.; Zhang, S.; Wu, S. 2022. Evolution of water resource allocation in the river basin between administrators and managers. Hydrology Research, 53(5):716-732. [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/nh.2022.128]
Water resources ; Water allocation ; River basins ; Decision making ; Regulations ; Managers ; Strategies ; Water security ; Water intake ; Water rights ; Models ; Game theory
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051131)
https://iwaponline.com/hr/article-pdf/53/5/716/1059207/nh0530716.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051131.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051131.pdf
(0.64 MB) (652 KB)
The reasonable allocation of water resources runs through the main links of regional water resource planning and management, which is a complex decision-making issue, ensures the sustainable development and utilization of water resources, and makes a greater contribution to the sustainable development of social economy. In this paper, evolutionary game theory is applied to the allocation of watershed water resources in a river basin. Also, the analysis of the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategies of water resource allocation among water resource manufacturers was done. It was found that the evolutionary game among the water resource manufacturers has only an evolutionary stability strategy. Considering the evolutionary game between water resource managers and water resource manufacturers, the evolutionary stability strategy is analyzed. This study suggests that there are two evolutionary stability strategies ( normal water intake, high level of regulation) and ( excess water intake, low level of regulation) between the water resource manufacturers and the administrative water resource regulators, where the strategy ( normal water intake, high level of regulation) is the expected direction. The evolution factors of the strategy ( normal water intake, high level of regulation) were analyzed. Furthermore, it also suggested that an effective reward and punishment mechanism will help to draw up excessive water, dismantle the conflicts between the water resource manufacturers and the administrative water resource regulators, and increase the benefits of both sides.
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