Your search found 6 records
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: IWMI Record No: H044786)
(3.12 MB) (3MB)
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: IWMI c2 Record No: H044787)
(3 MB)
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: PER Record No: H044911)
(0.20 MB)
In discussing the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, McCaffrey (1998) gave a theoretical example of the late-developer problem. This paper complements that theoretical example with a real case study of the Zerafshan basin in Central Asia. While McCaffrey addressed the water quantity issue in his example, the focus here also includes water pollution. The aim of the paper is to analyze some of the provisions of the mechanisms in the field of international water law—the Helsinki Rules and the UN Watercourses Convention—for water quantity and quality aspects, as well as to provide an insight into the basin regarding these two aspects.
4 Joubert, B.; Summers, R. 2018. The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action. Water Alternatives, 11(2):297-313.
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048804)
(0.58 MB) (596 KB)
In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa community water points are provided through external support in the form of enhanced boreholes fitted with hand pumps. The external agency supplying the improved water source commonly provides maintenance training and assists in organising a governance plan for the water point. Despite its apparent virtues the Village-Level Operation and Maintenance model still experiences high levels of water point failures, even where the technical training and material conditions are adequate. There has been relatively little investigation of the institutional factors that may influence the cases where villages successfully maintain their shared water source infrastructure. This research investigated five villages in central Malawi where communities had maintained their water point hand pumps for periods exceeding 10 years. The results point to the importance of informal institutions giving primacy to ad-hoc 'rules-in-use' that suit the local context, and adapting forms of free-rider sanctions that are typically minor, low level and triangulated with local norms and behaviours. The findings highlight collective action that is successful through day-to-day adaption and that serves to institutionalise cooperative behaviour through appeals to norms.
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050311)
(0.73 MB)
This paper looks at how local livelihoods and to a certain extent their transitions are embedded in, and in thrall to, power relations at higher levels. Placing the (re)shaping of livelihood pathways within the context of top-down hydropower planning, it shows how the latter predetermines farm households’ current farming strategies and future livelihood pathways. Taking two villages along the Mekong River, both of which are to be impacted by the planned Pak Beng hydropower dam in Pak Beng district, Oudomxay province, the paper illustrates how the pathways that rural livelihoods are taking in northern Laos are being shaped by decisions and processes embedded in national and regional exigencies. We argue that top-down approaches in hydropower planning, as manifested in the current institutional vacuum to formally deal with resettlement and compensation issues at the village level result in village authorities’ and potentially affected villagers’ inability to strategically convey and negotiate their views and concerns. Moreover, we reveal how it is the specter of change which drives livelihood adaptation, not change itself, thus illustrating how the defined compensation rules and procedures (re)shape farm households’ farming strategies and future livelihood pathways even prior to the construction of the hydropower dam.
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050490)
(3.14 MB)
This paper examines the governance and implementation of land compensation for the Laos-China Railway (LCR). It brings to light the central government’s strategy to use compensation rules and procedures as its means to extend its spatial power across the provinces, districts, and villages that are affected by the railway construction. We examine both the manifestations and effects of state power through the formulation and implementation of land compensation procedures. Taking Naxang village in Chomphet district, Luang Prabang province, in Laos as a case, the paper highlights: 1) how centralized compensation rules and procedures serve as a means for the central government to expand its power; 2) how power relations between central-provincial-district governments (re)shaped the actual project implementation especially pertaining to compensation valuation and payment; and 3) implications for smallholder livelihood options and strategies.
Powered by DB/Text
WebPublisher, from