Your search found 11 records
1 Chisaka, J. 2009. IWRM and Food Security Project in Kafue Basin: process documentation. Pretoria, South Africa: SADC/Danida Water Sector Support Programme; Pretoria, South Africa: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 22p.
Water resource management ; Project planning ; Project management ; Water storage ; Pumping ; Wells ; Participatory management ; Community involvement ; Leadership ; Water policy ; Central government ; Local government ; Irrigation water ; Food security / Zambia / Kafue River Basin / Katuba / Namwala / Chibombo
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H042714)
(0.91 MB)
The purpose of this report is to show the process of the intervention made through the implementation of the IWRM and Food Security Demonstration Project in Zambia. The report gives details of the project processes, showing the steps the project went through, the outcomes and its impact on the communities where it was implemented. The report is the result of a number of field visits made to the completed project sites, the sources of information have been; focus group meetings, interviews, discussions with key informants, beneficiaries the youth, male and female stakeholders and reviews of project activity reports, and direct observations. Therefore, what is presented here is a cumulative “factual and real time” opinion as to what has been observed and discussed. The Project was implemented over a period of two years in the three sites of the Kafue River Basin in the Central and Southern Provinces respectively. Katuba is at the Northern Bank of the Kafue River on the Mwembeshi River, a tributary of the Kafue River. Namwala is at the Southern Bank of the Kafue River, with Namwala River pouring its waters in the Kafue and meandering around the plains. The Kafue River Basin covers the Copper Belt Province in the North Western part of the country. Katuba is in Chibombo district and in the chiefdom of Mungule. In Namwala district, the project has been implemented in Mungaila and Mukobela Chiefdoms respectively. The report highlights some of the successes achieved by the intervention and some of the challenges faced by the target communities and recommends the way-forward to the sustainable management of water resources by the communities. The purpose of the project was to demonstrate the benefits of applying the IWRM principles and practices to reduce poverty and improve quality of life of the people through economic empowerment.
2 Balasubramanya, Soumya; Giordano, M.; Wichelns, D.; Sherpa, Tashi. 2014. Sharing hydropower revenues in Nepal, over time and across districts and regions. Water Resources and Rural Development, 4:104-111. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wrr.2014.10.007]
Water power ; Benefits ; Economic development ; Equity ; Water resources ; Local government ; Central government ; Decentralization ; Budgets / Nepal
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H046724)
(0.32 MB)
In recent years, the Government of Nepal has increased the amount of revenue it collects from hydropower operations and then distributes among districts and regions of the country. Larger, wealthier districts, which receive larger amounts of general revenues from the central government, also receive larger allocations of hydropower revenues. The per capita shares of hydropower revenue are notably larger in the Central andWestern Regions, which are home to most of Nepal’s hydropower facilities. Thus, the revenue sharing program does not favor poorer districts and regions with little hydropower development. Further, the hydropower revenue allocations to all development regions are small portions of the general revenues they receive. Consequently, the program is unlikely to have a substantial impact on economic development in poorer districts and regions.
3 Jeronimo, R. P.; Rap, Edwin; Vos, J. 2015. The politics of land use planning: gold mining in Cajamarca, Peru. Land Use Policy, 49:104-117. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.009]
Land use ; Planning ; Gold ; Mining ; Political aspects ; Ecology ; Economic aspects ; Environmental effects ; Farming systems ; Geographical Information Systems ; Stakeholders ; Water use ; Catchment areas ; Rural communities ; Urban population ; Central government ; Regional government ; Case studies / Peru / Cajamarca
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H047143)
(1.56 MB)
Ecological and Economic Zoning (EEZ) is a Land Use Planning (LUP) methodology that aims at defining separate areas for productive uses and conservation. EEZ is designed as a method that balances different interests and it devises land use policy through stakeholder participation, technical expertise and GIS modelling. The article presents the case study of EEZ in Cajamarca, Peru to analyse the LUP process in a situation of conflicting interests over future land and water use. Cajamarca is a department with rich gold deposits in the headwater catchment area upstream of the city of Cajamarca. During the last decade, rural communities and urban populations have continuously protested against the opening of new open pit mines, as they fear this will affect their water supply. Therefore, the EEZ process became part of a controversy between a powerful pro-mining coalition lead by the central government and a conservation coalition lead by the regional government. We conclude that in these circumstances, LUP cannot, technically or politically, accommodate the different values attributed to the headwater catchment.
4 International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 2015. Translating watershed guidelines on the ground. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 8p. (IWMI Water Policy Brief 38) [doi: https://doi.org/10.5337/2015.217]
Watershed management ; Guidelines ; Living standards ; Natural resources management ; Resource conservation ; Rainfed farming ; Central government ; State intervention ; Corporate culture ; Communication ; Policy making / India
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: IWMI Record No: H047333)
(595 KB)
5 Tran, T. T. H.; Zeller, M.; Suhardiman, Diana. 2016. Payments for ecosystem services in Hoa Binh province, Vietnam: an institutional analysis. Ecosystem Services, 22:83-93.
Payment for Ecosystem Services ; Ecosystem services ; Institutions ; Corporate culture ; Performance evaluation ; Environmental services ; Central government ; Stakeholders ; Forest conservation ; Forest protection ; Households ; Farmers ; Economic aspects / Vietnam / Hoa Binh Province
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H047763)
This study examines the institutional design and actual performance, of payments for ecosystem services (PES) in Vietnam. Taking Payments for Forest Environmental Services Program (PFES Program) implementation in Da Bac district, Hoa Binh province as a case study, it brings to light how PES program design and implementation contributed to the central government's objectives to: (1) involve stakeholders in forest management; (2) reduce the government's budget burden for forest protection; and (3) maintain political control over forest resources. In Vietnam, the PFES Program is implemented in a top-down manner. Participating households act as government-induced forest guards rather than forest owners. Incomplete design at the central-level results in poorer performance at lower levels and, the lack of strategic management makes it difficult to know whether the program has actually improved ecosystem services and forest management. While the PFES Program complements other institutions at the national- and local-levels, some institutional incompatibilities exist in terms of customary practices. It is unlikely, however, that these will develop into an institutional conflict.
6 Horbulyk, Ted. 2016. Water policy in Canada. In Renzetti, S.; Dupont, D. P. (Eds). Water policy and governance in Canada. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp.29-43.
Water policy ; Water allocation ; Water quality ; Water demand ; Water resources ; Water use ; Surface water ; Groundwater ; Central government ; Best practices / Canada
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H047857)
(0.17 MB)
Canada’s provincial, territorial and federal governments face key water policy decisions about the process of water allocation and the outcomes associated with alternative approaches. Water allocation refers to the systems that are used to decide which users are allowed to draw water from which sources, for which purposes, and when. Especially when water resources are under pressure from competing demands, or when water quality is threatened, it is logical to question whether the available water resources are being used in the best way possible. Water allocation policy is a multifaceted and far reaching tool with which governments can in uence the structure of the economy and quality of residents’ lives. Water allocation decisions in uence numerous uses of surface and groundwater resources, including such non-extractive uses as providing environmental, recreational and aesthetic bene ts when some of the water is left in situ . This chapter illustrates a range of speci c water policy issues and considerations that relate to water allocation, and provides an overview of current practices in each jurisdiction. A number of challenges are highlighted that will have to be addressed if society is to bene t fully from the potential gains that effective water allocation can deliver.
7 Carlitz, R. D. 2017. Money flows, water trickles: understanding patterns of decentralized water provision in Tanzania. World Development, 93:16-30. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.11.019]
Water supply ; Decentralization ; Financing ; Capital allocation ; Water availability ; Groundwater ; Infrastructure ; Central government ; Local government ; Political aspects ; Rural areas ; Population ; Poverty / Africa / Tanzania
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048109)
(0.76 MB)
Over the past three decades, an increasing number of low- and middle-income countries have decentralized water provision to the local government level, and have sought to more thoroughly involve users in service delivery. Such reforms reflect the twin goals of encouraging greater responsiveness to local needs and promoting sustainability. This study illustrates how the aims of decentralization can be undermined in the absence of robust democratic competition, and how governments interpret "demand" by voters in such settings. Focusing on the Tanzanian water sector, the paper first traces the distribution of money for water from the central government to the district level. Next, I consider how district governments use these funds to distribute water infrastructure within their jurisdictions, using geo-referenced data on all 75,000 water points serving rural Tanzanians. I find that the central government’s allocation of money to districts is fairly unresponsive to local needs. However, the pattern of distribution cannot primarily be explained by politics, with the exception of consistent favoritism of the Minister for Water’s home district. Political favoritism is more pronounced at the local level. Within districts, the distribution of new water infrastructure is skewed to favor localities with higher demonstrated levels of support for the ruling party. In addition, wealthier and better-connected communities—those with the resources to more effectively express their demands—are significantly more likely to benefit from new construction. This suggests that "demand-responsive" approaches to water provision can entrench regressive patterns of distribution.
8 Humphreys, E.; Schwartz, K. 2018. In the shadow of the city: financing water infrastructure in small towns in Burkina Faso. Water Policy, 20(S1):69-83. (Special issue: Water Services in Small Towns - Experiences from the Global South). [doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2018.005]
Water resources development ; Public finance ; Water supply ; Infrastructure ; Towns ; Rural areas ; Water institutions ; Corporate culture ; Water user associations ; Municipal governments ; Central government ; Expenditure ; Projects ; Partnerships ; Donors ; Funding ; Case studies / Burkina Faso / Hounde / Komsilga / Banfora / Moussodougou
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048708)
(0.25 MB)
The abundant praise awarded for the development of the urban water services sector in Burkina Faso stands in stark contrast with the development of the rural water services sector. This article examines the funding of water infrastructure in four small villages in Burkina Faso. The article finds that public funding for water infrastructure for these municipalities is largely nonexistent. First of all, central government makes very little funding available for rural areas. Funding that is made available is then also prioritized for regions that already are relatively well covered. Secondly, the municipalities themselves also prioritize other sectors over the water sector for the investment of locally generated revenue. As a result, these municipalities rely on donor funding for developing water supply in their villages. This dependence not only leaves these municipalities vulnerable to shifts in donor funding but can also lead to inequalities as some municipalities are better at attracting donor funds than others. Some small towns are thus confronted with a double bias. First an urban bias in which the majority of public finance goes to urban centres. Second, by a donor-bias in which some towns are favoured for project implementation due to favourable site characteristics.
9 Suhardiman, Diana; Bright, J.; Palmano, C. 2021. The politics of legal pluralism in the shaping of spatial power in Myanmar’s land governance. Journal of Peasant Studies, 48(2):411-435. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2019.1656200]
Land governance ; Legal pluralism ; Political power ; Land use ; Land rights ; Land policies ; Central government ; Political institutions ; Legal frameworks ; Farmers ; Land tenure ; Customary tenure ; Land titling ; Strategies ; Villages ; Local communities ; Case studies / Myanmar / Karen State / Mukaplow / Maepoe Noh
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H049411)
(2.05 MB)
Following the National League for Democracy’s landslide victory in the 2015 national election, Myanmar embarked on a series of legal and political transitions. This paper highlights parallel processes alongside such transitions. Linking land governance with the ongoing peace processes, and taking Karen state as a case study, it brings to light how both processes are in fact closely interlinked. Building on legal pluralism research, we argue that in the context of ethnic states, farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights resemble the very notion of state transformation.
10 Suhardiman, Diana; Karki, Emma; Bastakoti, Ram C. 2021. Putting power and politics central in Nepal’s water governance. Development Policy Review, 39(4):569-587. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12519]
Water governance ; Political systems ; Water resources ; Water management ; Development planning ; Bureaucracy ; Federalism ; Political parties ; Decision making ; Central government ; Stakeholders ; Government agencies ; Civil society organizations ; River basins ; Hydropower ; Development projects / Nepal
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H049871)
(0.59 MB)
Motivation: Power relations, and the politics shaping and reshaping them, are key to determining influence and outcomes in water governance. But current discourse on water governance tends to present decision-making as neutral and technical unaffected by political influences.
Purpose: Taking Nepal as a case, this article examines the close interlinkages between bureaucratic and political competition that indirectly influence decisions and outcomes on water governance, while placing this within the context of state transformation.
Approach and Methods: An in-depth case study examines the interactions of politicians and bureaucrats shaping decisions on water governance. It draws on semi-structured interviews and power-mapping to reveal insights from key stakeholders with decision-making power in national management of water resources.
Findings: Political competition drives the country’s development agenda and planning, resulting in fragmented development planning. It works in tandem with the prevailing bureaucratic competition in water resources management. It highlights the need to link the discourse and analysis water governance with processes of state transformation. The current fragmented development planning processes could serve as entry points for civil society groups and the wider society to convey their voice and exert their influence.
Policy implications: Following federalism, the political transfer of power and decision-making, to achieve political representation and social justice, rests with locally elected governing bodies. This coincides with the government’s push to manage water resources through river basin planning. There is a need for greater participation from the local governing bodies and understanding of politics and power shape water governance.
Purpose: Taking Nepal as a case, this article examines the close interlinkages between bureaucratic and political competition that indirectly influence decisions and outcomes on water governance, while placing this within the context of state transformation.
Approach and Methods: An in-depth case study examines the interactions of politicians and bureaucrats shaping decisions on water governance. It draws on semi-structured interviews and power-mapping to reveal insights from key stakeholders with decision-making power in national management of water resources.
Findings: Political competition drives the country’s development agenda and planning, resulting in fragmented development planning. It works in tandem with the prevailing bureaucratic competition in water resources management. It highlights the need to link the discourse and analysis water governance with processes of state transformation. The current fragmented development planning processes could serve as entry points for civil society groups and the wider society to convey their voice and exert their influence.
Policy implications: Following federalism, the political transfer of power and decision-making, to achieve political representation and social justice, rests with locally elected governing bodies. This coincides with the government’s push to manage water resources through river basin planning. There is a need for greater participation from the local governing bodies and understanding of politics and power shape water governance.
11 Suhardiman, Diana; DiCarlo, J.; Keovilignavong, Oulavanh; Rigg, J.; Nicol, Alan. 2021. (Re)constructing state power and livelihoods through the Laos-China railway project. Geoforum, 124:79-88. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.06.003]
Railways ; Development projects ; Land valuation ; Compensation ; Strategies ; Central government ; Livelihoods ; Transport infrastructure ; Large scale systems ; Political aspects ; Rules ; Procedures ; Government agencies ; Villages ; Households ; Social aspects / Lao People's Democratic Republic / China / Luang Prabang / Chomphet / Naxang
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H050490)
(3.14 MB)
This paper examines the governance and implementation of land compensation for the Laos-China Railway (LCR). It brings to light the central government’s strategy to use compensation rules and procedures as its means to extend its spatial power across the provinces, districts, and villages that are affected by the railway construction. We examine both the manifestations and effects of state power through the formulation and implementation of land compensation procedures. Taking Naxang village in Chomphet district, Luang Prabang province, in Laos as a case, the paper highlights: 1) how centralized compensation rules and procedures serve as a means for the central government to expand its power; 2) how power relations between central-provincial-district governments (re)shaped the actual project implementation especially pertaining to compensation valuation and payment; and 3) implications for smallholder livelihood options and strategies.
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