Your search found 3 records
1 Pande, S.; Savenije, H. H. G. 2016. A sociohydrological model for smallholder farmers in Maharashtra, India. Water Resources Research, 52(3):1923-1947. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/2015WR017841]
Smallholders ; Farmers ; Social aspects ; Hydrology ; Models ; Water storage ; Capital allocation ; Income ; Living standards ; Labour costs ; Remuneration ; Expenditure ; Agricultural prices ; Cotton ; Sugarcane ; Soil fertility ; Fertilizer application ; Irrigation ; Livestock production ; Grasslands ; Fodder / India / Maharashtra / Marathwada
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H047760)
(1.81 MB)
We present a sociohydrological model that can help us to better understand the system dynamics of a smallholder farmer. It couples the dynamics of the six main assets of a typical smallholder farmer: water storage capacity, capital, livestock, soil fertility, grazing access, and labor. The hydroclimatic variability, which is a main driver and source of uncertainty of the smallholder system, is accounted for at subannual scale. The model incorporates rule-based adaptation mechanisms of smallholders (for example, adjusting expenditures on food and fertilizers and selling livestocks) when farmers face adverse sociohydrological conditions, such as low annual rainfall, occurrence of dry spells, or variability of input or commodity prices. We have applied the model to analyze the sociohydrology of a cash crop producing smallholder in Maharashtra, India, in a semisynthetic case study setting. Of late, this region has witnessed many suicides of farmers who could not extricate themselves out of the debt trap. These farmers lacked irrigation and were susceptible to fluctuating commodity prices and climatic variability. We studied the sensitivity of a smallholder’s capital, an indicator of smallholder well-being, to two types of cash crops (cotton and sugarcane), water storage capacity, availability of irrigation, initial capital that a smallholder starts with, prevalent wage rates, and access to grazing. We found that (i) smallholders with low water storage capacities and no irrigation are most susceptible to distress, (ii) a smallholder’s well-being is low at low wage rates, (iii) wage rate is more important than absolution of debt, (iv) well-being is sensitive to water storage capacity up to a certain level, and (v) well-being increases with increasing area available for livestock grazing. Our results indicate that government intervention to absolve the debt of farmers or to invest in local storage to buffer rainfall variability may not be enough. In addition, alternative sources of income may need to be provided, for instance by ensuring minimum wages or by providing more access to grazing areas.
2 Mandara, C. G.; Niehof, A.; van der Horst, H. 2017. Women and rural water management: token representatives or paving the way to power? Water Alternatives, 10(1):116-133.
Gender ; Women's participation ; Water management ; Domestic water ; Water supply ; Rural communities ; Water governance ; Committees ; Community involvement ; Assemblies ; Social welfare ; Villages ; Leadership ; Decision making ; Households ; Socioeconomic environment ; Development projects ; Maintenance ; Capital allocation ; Case studies / Tanzania / Dodoma / Kondoa / Mpwapwa
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048056)
http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol10/v10issue1/345-a10-1-7/file
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H048056.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H048056.pdf
(0.60 MB) (608 KB)
This paper discusses how informal structures intersect with women’s participation in formally created decision-making spaces for managing domestic water at the village level in Tanzania. The results reveal the influence of the informal context on women’s access to and performance in the formal decision-making spaces. Overall, there is low community involvement in local governance structures, and in most village assemblies that of women is even less. Only in the Social Welfare Committee women are fairly well represented, presumably because of its linkage with the traditional division of labour and women’s practical gender needs. In the Village Water Committees, women’s representation is regulated by a quota system but women rarely occupy leadership positions. Even when husbands are supportive, patriarchal culture, scepticism and negative stereotypical assumptions on female leadership frustrate the government’s effort to enlarge women’s representation in the local decision-making spaces. Three entry points for change were identified: successful women leaders as role models; women’s passive participation in village meetings that could develop into active participation; and women’s membership of social and economic groups which strengthens their skills and bargaining position.
3 Carlitz, R. D. 2017. Money flows, water trickles: understanding patterns of decentralized water provision in Tanzania. World Development, 93:16-30. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.11.019]
Water supply ; Decentralization ; Financing ; Capital allocation ; Water availability ; Groundwater ; Infrastructure ; Central government ; Local government ; Political aspects ; Rural areas ; Population ; Poverty / Africa / Tanzania
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H048109)
(0.76 MB)
Over the past three decades, an increasing number of low- and middle-income countries have decentralized water provision to the local government level, and have sought to more thoroughly involve users in service delivery. Such reforms reflect the twin goals of encouraging greater responsiveness to local needs and promoting sustainability. This study illustrates how the aims of decentralization can be undermined in the absence of robust democratic competition, and how governments interpret "demand" by voters in such settings. Focusing on the Tanzanian water sector, the paper first traces the distribution of money for water from the central government to the district level. Next, I consider how district governments use these funds to distribute water infrastructure within their jurisdictions, using geo-referenced data on all 75,000 water points serving rural Tanzanians. I find that the central government’s allocation of money to districts is fairly unresponsive to local needs. However, the pattern of distribution cannot primarily be explained by politics, with the exception of consistent favoritism of the Minister for Water’s home district. Political favoritism is more pronounced at the local level. Within districts, the distribution of new water infrastructure is skewed to favor localities with higher demonstrated levels of support for the ruling party. In addition, wealthier and better-connected communities—those with the resources to more effectively express their demands—are significantly more likely to benefit from new construction. This suggests that "demand-responsive" approaches to water provision can entrench regressive patterns of distribution.
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