Your search found 6 records
1 Cameron, A. C.; Trivedi, P. K. 2010. Microeconometrics using stata. Rev. ed. College Station, TX, USA: Stata Press. 706p.
Microeconomics ; Statistical methods ; Econometrics ; Mathematical models ; Computer software ; Data management ; Computer programming ; Optimization methods ; Linear models ; Regression analysis ; Non linear programming ; Computer graphics ; Simulation ; Testing
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 330.015195 G000 CAM Record No: H047139)
(1.57 MB)
2 Cameron, A. C.; Trivedi, P. K. 2010. Microeconometrics using stata. Rev. ed. College Station, TX, USA: Stata Press. 706p.
Microeconomics ; Statistical methods ; Econometrics ; Mathematical models ; Computer software ; Data management ; Computer programming ; Optimization methods ; Linear models ; Regression analysis ; Non linear programming ; Computer graphics ; Simulation ; Testing
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 330.015195 G000 CAM c2 Record No: H047140)
(1.57 MB)
3 Adam-Bradford, A.; Gebrezgabher, Solomie. 2018. Briquettes from municipal solid waste (COOCEN, Kigali, Rwanda) - Case Study. In Otoo, Miriam; Drechsel, Pay (Eds.). Resource recovery from waste: business models for energy, nutrient and water reuse in low- and middle-income countries. Oxon, UK: Routledge - Earthscan. pp.61-71.
Briquettes ; Renewable energy ; Municipal wastes ; Solid wastes ; Composts ; Microeconomics ; Supply chain ; Marketing ; Socioeconomic environment ; Environmental impact ; Public-private cooperation ; Partnerships / Rwanda / Kigali
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: IWMI Record No: H048628)
(1.35 MB)
4 Smith, M.; Cross, K.; Paden, M.; Laban, P. (Eds.) 2016. Spring: managing groundwater sustainably. Gland, Switzerland: International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 132p.
Groundwater management ; Water use ; Water pollution ; Water governance ; Water policy ; Water law ; Water resources ; Water institutions ; Water table ; Sustainable development ; Economic aspects ; Incentives ; Socioeconomic environment ; Microeconomics ; Macroeconomics ; Social institutions ; Stakeholders ; Aquifers ; Biodiversity
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 553.79 G000 SMI Record No: H049069)
https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/2016-039.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H049069.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H049069.pdf
(7.55 MB) (7.55 MB)
5 Agudo-Dominguez, A.; Perez-Blanco, C. D.; Gil-Garcia, L.; Ortega, J. A.; Dasgupta, S. 2022. Climate-sensitive hydrological drought insurance for irrigated agriculture under deep uncertainty. Insightful results from the Cega River Basin in Spain. Agricultural Water Management, 274:107938. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2022.107938]
Drought ; Weather index insurance ; Hydrological factors ; Irrigated farming ; River basins ; Climate change ; Crop insurance ; Water allocation ; Irrigation ; Microeconomics ; Models ; Uncertainty / Spain / Cega River Basin
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051466)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378377422004851/pdfft?md5=0bcfe924f191012b1592a2b975ae8d54&pid=1-s2.0-S0378377422004851-main.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051466.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051466.pdf
(5.24 MB) (5.24 MB)
This paper assesses the feasibility and robustness of an index-based insurance scheme against hydrological droughts under climate change. To this end, we develop a grand ensemble that samples both modeling and scenario uncertainty in the estimation of the insurance risk premium, so to reveal potential unfavorable surprises and minimize regret in the design of the proposed insurance scheme. The grand ensemble combines four microeconomic models and seven GAMLSS models, which are run for three alternative climate change scenarios: stationary climate/no climate change, RCP 2.6, and RCP 8.5. Methods are illustrated with an application to the Cega River Sub-basin (CRS) in central Spain. Results indicate that for a conventional deductible of 30%, the proposed index-based insurance scheme would be actuarially feasible and affordable under all models for the stationary climate scenario (i.e., robust). For climate change scenarios RCP 2.6 and 8.5 and a 30% deductible, the suggested index-based insurance would be actuarially feasible under most models, albeit some outliers point towards potential unfavorable surprises. Lower deductibles decrease feasibility, particularly for deductibles <10%.
6 Perez-Blanco, C. D.; Sapino, F.; Saiz-Santiago, P. 2023. First-degree price discrimination water bank to reduce reacquisition costs and enhance economic efficiency in agricultural water buyback. Ecological Economics, 205:107694. [doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107694]
Agricultural water management ; Water scarcity ; Water markets ; Economic aspects ; Water policies ; Mathematical models ; Decision making ; Public institutions ; Uncertainty ; Hydrology ; Climate change ; Water allocation ; Water resources ; Environmental flows ; Microeconomics ; Water demand ; Water supply ; Water rights / Spain / Upper Douro Basin
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H051729)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092200355X/pdfft?md5=bb1b1aab97242c1613940a1d5cfae7c2&pid=1-s2.0-S092180092200355X-main.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051729.pdf
https://vlibrary.iwmi.org/pdf/H051729.pdf
(7.30 MB) (7.30 MB)
In water buyback programs a public institution (the water bank) purchases predetermined amount of water from willing sellers, part of which can be reallocated to users in a subsequent lease phase. This makes possible to buy water at low monopsonistic prices and sell a fraction of this water at high monopolistic prices, where the water reacquired in excess of sales is used to restore natural assets. We propose a price discrimination water bank where the public institution leverages its monopsonistic (monopolistic) position to pay (ask) a price for every unit of water sold (bought) that matches the reserve price of every willing buyer (seller) in the market. Thus, both the consumer and producer surpluses are wholly transformed into public revenues, which reduces the budgetary burden of the environmental restoration without negatively impacting economic efficiency. We illustrate the performance of the price discrimination water bank under uncertainty through an hydroeconomic multi-model ensemble that is applied to the Upper Douro sub-basin (Spain). Our results show that the price discrimination water bank can achieve the same water reacquisition target as a conventional water bank (no price discrimination, no lease phase) at a significantly lower cost (59.5%–288.8% reduction) while achieving a significantly higher productive surplus (331%–570% increase).
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