Your search found 6 records
1 Cotroneo, G. V.; Rumer, R. R. (Eds.) 1994. Hydraulic engineering '94. Vol.1: Proceedings of the 1994 Conference, Buffalo, New York, August 1-5, 1994. New York, NY, USA: ASCE. xxii, 726p.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 627 G000 COT Record No: H019279)
2 Gleick, P. H. 1998. The world's water 1998-1999: The biennial report on freshwater resources. Washington, DC, USA: Island Press. xii, 307p.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 333.91 G000 GLE Record No: H023445)
3 Tiwary, Rakesh. 2006. Conflicts over international waters. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(17):1684-1692.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: IWMI 333.91 G000 TIW, P 7536 Record No: H038708)
4 Bhaduri, Anik; Barbier, E. 2008. Linking rivers in the Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin: exploring the transboundary effects. In Amarasinghe, Upali A.; Sharma, Bharat R. (Eds.) Strategic Analyses of the National River Linking Project (NRLP) of India, Series 2. Proceedings of the Workshop on Analyses of Hydrological, Social and Ecological Issues of the NRLP, New Delhi, India, 9-10 October 2007. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI) pp.373-395.
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: IWMI 333.9162 G635 AMA Record No: H041813)
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The following paper explores the possible inter-linkage of the Ganges and Brahmaputra River Basin and analyzes its effect on future water allocation between the upstream country, India, and the downstream country, Bangladesh. We find that water transfer from the Brahmaputra River could be mutually beneficial for both countries. However, the only possible motivation for the richer upstream country, India, to agree to transfer water to the poorer downstream country, Bangladesh, is political altruism. Using a political economy model we find that, if there is a good political relationship between India and Bangladesh, then India could be altruistic toward Bangladesh and transfer more water downstream. Changes in political altruism factor, however, could entice India to exercise unilateral diversion, in which case simulations predict that Bangladesh would incur large environmental damages. Political uncertainty may also result in unilateral diversion of water by India, and could prevent agreement on water transfers from the Brahmaputra. We therefore explore the conditions under which Bangladesh could accept an Indian proposal to transfer water from Brahmaputra, despite political uncertainty.
5 Lahiri-Dutt, K.; Wasson, R. J. (Eds.) 2008. Water first: issues and challenges for nations and communities in South Asia. New Delhi, India: Sage Publications. 435p.
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: 333.91 G570 LAH Record No: H042090)
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H047964)
(1.84 MB)
International rivers are conventionally understood as watercourses that cross national boundaries, while borders themselves are taken to be static and given – passive features over and across which riparian processes unfold. Employing such straightforward framings of international rivers and borders, academic studies and policy analyses of transboundary water governance perpetuate problematic ideas about the relevant scales and actors involved in international river conflicts and crises. Through a historical examination of the Ganges River and the Indo-Bangladeshi border, I introduce the ‘river-border complex’ as a new framework for reconceptualizing international rivers and borders as synergistic, co-constitutive and interdependent.
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