Your search found 15 records
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: 333.91 G214 BAR Record No: H012375)
2 Barbier, E. B.. 1989. The economic value of ecosystems: 1 - Tropical wetlands. London, UK: IIED. 15p. (Gatekeeper series no. LEEC 89-02)
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 4939 Record No: H023169)
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 5241 Record No: H024772)
4 Barbier, E. B.. 1990. The farm-level economics of soil conservation: The uplands of Java. Land Economics, 66(2):199-211.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 6078 Record No: H030583)
5 Barbier, E. B.. 1995. The economics of soil erosion: Theory, methodology and examples. Paper based on a presentation to the Fifth Biannual Workshop on Economy and Environment in Southeast Asia, Singapore, November 28-30, 1995. 36p.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 6079 Record No: H030584)
6 Barbier, E. B.. 2002. Sustainable use of wetlands valuing tropical wetland benefits: Economic methodologies and applications. The Geographical Journal, 159(1):22-32.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 6381 Record No: H032498)
7 Barbier, E. B.. 2003. Upstream dams and downstream water allocation: the case of the Hadejia Jama’are Flood Plain. Paper presented at the Environmental Policy Forum, Center for Environmental Science and Policy, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, November 7, 2002. 31p.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 6630 Record No: H033441)
8 Acharya, G.; Barbier, E. B.. 2000. Valuing groundwater recharge through agricultural production in the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands in northern Nigeria. Agricultural Economics, 22:247-259.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 6708 Record No: H033933)
9 Barbier, E. B.; Thompson, J. R. 1998. The value of water: Floodplain versus large-scale irrigation benefits in northern Nigeria. Ambio, 27(6):434-440.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 6722 Record No: H033969)
10 Barbier, E. B.. 2000. The economic linkages between rural poverty and land degradation: Some evidence from Africa. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 82:355-370.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 7416 Record No: H037578)
11 Barbier, E. B.. 2000. The values of wetlands: Landscape and institutional perspectives. Ecological Economics. Special Issue - The values of wetlands: Landscape and institutional perspectives, 35:47-61.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 7534 Record No: H038628)
12 Barbier, E. B.. 2006. Mangrove dependency and the livelihoods of coastal communities in Thailand. In Hoanh, Chu Thai; Tuong, T. P.; Gowing, J. W.; Hardy, B. (Eds.). Environment and livelihoods in tropical coastal zones: managing agriculture, fishery, aquaculture conflicts. Wallingford, UK: CABI; Los Banos, Philippines: International Rice Research Institute (IRRI); Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI) pp.126-139. (Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture Series 2)
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: IWMI 639.8 G000 HOA Record No: H039111)
13 Barbier, E. B.. 1994. Valuing environmental functions: Tropical wetlands. Land Economics, 70(2):155-173.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: P 7584 Record No: H039153)
14 Bhaduri, Anik; Barbier, E. B.. 2008. International water transfer and sharing: The case of the Ganges River. Environment and Development Economics, 13:29-51.
(Location: IWMI-HQ Call no: IWMI 346.0432 G635 BHA Record No: H039615)
The following paper is concerned with water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh, with possible augmentation through water transfers from Nepal. We analyzed the case when water from Nepal can be transferred to Bangladesh through the upstream country, India, as the local geography only permits such water transfer. A game theoretic model is formulated to determine the optimal share of water diverted to Bangladesh by India, and the optimal amount of water transfer from Nepal. India may gain positive externalities from such water transfer. The positive externalities generated fromwater transfer fromNepalmay influence thewater share of both India and Bangladesh. In the absence of altruism, India would allow less water flow to Bangladesh than in the case when there is no provision to buy water from Nepal. We also explored whether positive externalities could induce India to buy water jointly with Bangladesh, and such a case will only occur if the countries possess altruistic concerns and share water according to an agreement.
(Location: IWMI HQ Call no: e-copy only Record No: H049966)
(0.55 MB)
Developing countries are highly vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic, in part due to the lack of international support for ensuring progress towards the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Yet the mounting financial burden faced by all countries means that additional support is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future. It is critical that developing countries find innovative policy mechanisms to achieve sustainability and development aims in a cost-effective manner. This requires identifying affordable policies that can yield immediate progress towards several SDGs together and aligns economic incentives for longer term sustainable development. We identify three policies that meet these criteria: a fossil fuel subsidy swap to fund clean energy investments and dissemination of renewable energy in rural areas; reallocating irrigation subsidies to improve water supply, sanitation and wastewater infrastructure; and a tropical carbon tax, which is a levy on fossil fuels that funds natural climate solutions. Such innovative and cost-effective policy mechanisms do not require substantial external support, and they foster greater progress towards achieving the SDGs in poorer economies.
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